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THE NEED FOR THE "LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTIONAL
PRINCIPLE" IN A POLICY CENTERED CONFLICT
OF LAWS*
EDWIN W. BRIGGS**
Introduction
In a series of earlier studies, some of them published,, the attempt has been made to demonstrate that the only basis on which to
explain many decisions in the conflicts field, is to recognize the fact
that the courts are guided directly by policy considerations; that the
policy considerations vary greatly from field to field, and that it is
of the utmost importance that these varying policies be made as clear
and explicit as is possible in formally stated rules. This has led to
the further conclusion that any analysis providing an adequate
2
rationale for conflict of laws generally, must be policy centered.
Practically all modem studies, as well as judicial utterances,
support this shift to policy.3 Those favoring it, however, have failed
to realize that, to implement adequately the multitude of varying
This article is being printed concurrently in the International and Comparative Law Quarterly by arrangement. [Ed.]
*This paper was presented in condensed form as an address before the
Round Table on Conflict of Laws as a part of the program at the annual
convention of the American Association of Law Schools, held this past
Winter, December, 1954, in New York City, New York.
**Professor of Law, Montana State University.
1. Briggs, "Renvoi" in the Succession to Tangibles: A False Issue
Based on Faulty Analysis, 64 Yale L. J. 195 (1954) ; Briggs, Utility of the
JurisdictionalPrinciple it; a Policy Centered Conflict of Laws, 6 Vand. L.
Rev. 667 (1953. Symposium on Conflicts) ; Briggs, The Jurisdictional-Choiceof-Law Relation in Conflicts Rules, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1948); Briggs,
The Dual Relationship of the Rules of Conflict of Laws in the Succession
Field, 15 Miss. L. J. 77 (1943).
2. Though implicit in all of the above cited articles, the first two articles
cited supra note 1, formally develop this proposition. It is the purpose of the
present paper to elaborate on that same thesis at length.
3. Cheshire, Graveson, Falconbridge, Wolff, Cook, Griswold, Yntema,
Rabel, and many others, fully support this statement. The discussion and
citations following will bear out the assertion. A surprising number of
English decisions equally support the proposition: In re Duke of Wellington,
Glentanar v. Wellington, [1947] 1 Ch. 506, is a recent case, and already a
classical one, deciding that the scope of a reference to foreign law should
be determined in the light of the reason for that reference, in the first place.
A large number of cases determining the validity in England, of foreign confiscation decrees, can be explained only on the basis of "policy," purely and
simply. All of these cases are discussed at length in Briggs, "Renvoi" in the
Succession to Tangibles: A False Issue Based on Faulty Analysis, 64 Yale
L. J. 195 (1954). Yet another very recent English case, in which the court
shows a readiness to correlate "judicial policy," in the conflicts field, with
"legislative policy" governing divorce, is Travers v. Holley, [1953] 2 All
E. R. 794. And, in the larger perspective, the swelling movement conceiving
the primary function of law, to be that of "balancing (or equating) potentially
conflicting interests," exemplified especially in Pound's monumental contributions, and greatly elaborated in Julius Stone's superb work, The Province
and Function of Law (1950), irresistibly press in the direction of "policy."
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policies relevant in a single case, and to determine correctly whose
legislative policy actually controls a given issue, it becomes absolutely necessary to separate and keep separated a't least two different classes of conflicts rules (in terms of their essential function or
use), serving fundamentally different functions, which the courts
and writers have indiscriminately confused and lumped together
under the single descriptive of "choice of law." In terms suggesting
these critically different functions, these two classes of rules are
aptly described as follows: 1. legislative jurisdictional, or power
recognizing rules; 2. choice of law rules. Though there is little
novelty in these formal terms, there may be novelty to some, in the
use to which we put them.
Further, only by keeping these two classes of rules consistently
separated, does it become apparent that, when placed in their proper
relationship to each other, to reflect what the courts actually do, or
should do, one such class of rules holds a controlling or dominating
position, while the other class is subordinated thereto. This controlling-subordinated relationship is graphically depicted by the
following chart, in an action involving either interests in land, or
succession to movable, with "S" the situs thereof:
F
JURISDICTIONAL
RULE
Situs Controls
CHOICE OF LAW

S
JURISDICTIONAL
RULE
Situs Controls

T
JURISDICTIONAL
RULE
Situs Controls

(None for this case)

H-DOICE OF LAW
Dom~nf~oNational or
Place
.ecution

INTERNAL LAW
Dispositive Rule -

I. NTER
L LAW-,., INTERNAL LAW
Dispositive Rule
4 Dispositive Rule

CHOICE OF LAW
(None for this case)

As shown in the graph, each choice of law rule is consistently subordinated to and limited by a controlling jurisdictional rule. In this
diagram, F represents the forum; S represents the legal system to
which F refers to recognize an exclusive legislative power; T reprepresents a possible third state to which S may refer by its own
4
choice of law.
4. Briggs, Utility of the JurisdictionaIl Principle in a Policy Centcred
Conflict of Laws, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 667, 669, 697-700 (1953), states in con-

siderable detail, how and why the difficulties of the supposed "renvoi prob-

lem," never develop when consisrent effect is given to the varying reasons
causing different courts to refer to a foreign law. The procedure depicted in
the graph generally, likewise is discussed in considerable detail there.
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When I first presented this diagram to the Seminar in Conflict
of Laws, at Harvard, in the spring of 1936, we considered its possible application to some five different areas or fields, deciding that
it seemed to set forth the correct anaylsis for those fields. Land,
succession to chattels, perhaps divorce, possibly marriage, and the
various "borrowing statutes," which actually come from several
different fields, were the materials primarily considered. According to this analysis, in these fields, some one law is recognized as
having exclusive legislative jurisdiction, and the courts of all other
legal systems decide this precise case as nearly like that system's
courts would decide it, as is practicable.5
Though it was very difficult for Professor Beale to accept some
of its clearest implications, (such as that the only law with an applicable 'choice-of-law' in a sucession case is the situs) nevertheless,
the chart convinced him that our analysis generally was sound. On
the other hand, though Professor Griswold, now Dean of the Harvard Law School, also present at this seminar, accepted without
apparent qualification our anaylsis of these fields, based on the "dual
category" expressed here, he always has been strongly opposed to
the use of this graph. Nevertheless, in a series of subsequent studies,
both published and unpublished, we have continued a rigorous
testing of the thesis, as depicted in that graph, with its implications.
In our first published study, 6 we made an intensive and critical
examination of just one field, the law of succession, to test the thesis
thoroughly. It stood up. With an examination of other fields, we also
shifted the center of our interest from that of simply giving a complete and accurate description of what the cases actually stand for in
a particular field, in terms of formal rules, to that of ascertaining
the basic policies behind those rules. From such shift there emerged
our third fundamental proposition, becoming almost self-evident,
once it was clearly stated: The Policy Reasons Causing F (if a
non-situs or similar court), to refer to S (if the situs or similar
law), are fundamentally different, from those which may cause S
(legislatively) to refer to still another law than its own. This being
so, it becomes evident that it is worse than useless-it piles confusion upon confusion-to try to develop any kind of formula to be
applied by all courts alike when they refer to a foreign law-as
5. The strongest possible judicial utterance of this principle is found in,

In re Duke of Wellington, Glentanar v. Wellington, [1947] 1 Ch. 506, 514,

construing the will of an Englishman, devising Spanish land. For discussion
hereof, see Briggs, "Renvoi" in the Succession of Tangibles: A False Issue
Based on Faculty Analysis, 64 Yale L. J. 195,201, particularly at 205-206 (1954).
6. Briggs, The Dual Relationship of the Rules of Conflict of Laws in
the Succession Field, 15 Miss. L. J. 77 (1943).
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insisting either that they always should, or that they never should
7
include the foreign law's conflicts rules.
The policy causing the non-situs law to refer to the situs law
can best be served only by including S's choice of law rule; in contrast, the policies most commonly causing S to refer either to F or
to T, generally can best be served by going directly to the applicable
foreign internal rule. With this last fundamental proposition clearly
in mind, following the series of references depicted in the above
graph, by following the arrows shown there, fourthly, it becomes
clear that F, the forum, may include the "choice of law" rule found
in S, the law with the controlling governmental interest, without
ever getting into the dreaded "circulus inextricabilis" of renvoi, because S's choice of law generally will select directly an internal or
dispositive rule, regardless of from what law it takes that rule.
Hence, demonstrably, the so-called "renvoi problem," in terms of
the issues traditionally argued, is a false issue-a straw manquickly disappearing in this policy centered conflicts." Likewise, as a
fifth important conclusion, practically all of the apparent difficulties
with characterization preoccupying scholars and courts in the past,
have resulted from this same confusion of policiesY
Developing the postulate further, that a non-situs courts refers
to the situs' law for a very different reason from that causing the
situs court to refer to any other law, in the Yale Law Journal for
December, 1954,10 we seek to demonstrate the error in the suggestion, whatever its source, that, when F refers to a foreign law, generally, or as a matter of course, it should consider itself doing so for
the purpose of sitting and judging just as would the foreign court.
In that same paper we also try to demonstrate that the cases in the
five principal fields which we originally relied on, do not support the
"sitting and judging" formula as a generalized practice, contrary to
Dean Griswold's use of them in Renvoi Revisited."
This series of studies ard conclusions all combine to support
an anlysis of cases and a procedure utilizing, at least in considerable
measure, what we may call "the jurisdictional principle." By "jurisdictional principle" we mean the following: The practice of recognizing an exclusive legislative power in some one or limited number
7. See note 5 supra.
8.

See note 4 supra. See also, Briggs, "Reuvoi" in the Succession to

Tangibles: A False Issue Based on Faulty Analysis, 64 Yale L. J. 195 (1954).
9. See note 4 supra, particularly from 700 to 706. Though only introducing the problem, 'briefly discussing a number of the more difficult characterization questions, it justifies the above statement.
10. Briggs, "Renvoi" in the Succession to Tangibles: A False Issue
Based on Faulty Analysis, 64 Y21e L. J. 195 (1954).
11. Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1938).
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of determinate legal systems; whereupon every legal system so
recognizing, when acting judicially or otherwise, through appropriate agencies, 12 does its practicablebest to create the rights involved just as would that system, acting judicially or otherwise,
through appropriate agencies. Our discussion of "The Utility of
the Jurisdictional Principle in a Policy Centered Conflicts"' 13 suggests something of the possible scope of its value in this regard.
Since perhaps the most influential writer of recent times in the
field devoted practically all of his time in an effort to extirpate the
jurisdictional principle from conflicts law, 14 this proposition may
give pause to some. Although the serious shortcomings of Cook's
analysis at long last, are beginning to be realized more generally,' 5
his writings have so influenced recent past thinking and still so
condition the thinking of many-" seeking a more dynamic treatment of conflicts, that his heresy has become orthodoxy for many,
making our thesis heresy, in turn. But a short answer to Cook's
arguments, is that, though Cook assailed "jurisdiction" with his
utmost vigor, on "logical and legal grounds," he did not for a
moment consider its possible need on functional and analytical
grounds. It is precisely on those grounds that we rest our case for
"the jurisdictional principle." Indeed, repeating the proposition
stated at the outset, that any adequate rationale must be policy centered, we now raise the further question of whether any system
of law can be consciously and fully oriented to policy without full
utilization of the "jurisdictional principle."
12. Although there are certain very important differences, this definition of the "jurisdictional principle," has much common ground with that
found in Section 42 of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934), for "jurisdiction": ". . . 'Jurisdiction' means the power of a state to create interests
which under the principles of the common law will be recognized as valid
in other states."
13. 6 Vand. L. Rev. 667 (1953).
14. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1942),
in entirety, but particularly Chapters 1 and 2.
15. The most incisive critical appraisal of Cook, yet to appear in print,
is by a very close personal friend of his, Yntema, The Historic Bases of
Private IntcrnationalLaw, 2 Am. J. Comp. L. 297, 314-317 (1953).
16. The large number of American scholars influenced by Cook are not
the only ones so affected. That Cook's "local law" theory is pure orthodoxy
for Fale6nbridge, see his Essays on the Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 1954), especially ch. 2, where he uncritically accepts Cook's entire analysis, rejecting
"jurisdiction," vested or acquired rights, and insisting on the omnicompetence
of the forum in every situation. That Cheshire has been considerably influenced by him also, is attested by his frequent approving citations of Cook:
Cheshire, Private International Law (3d ed. 1947) 7, 69, 76, 84, 85, 308, 309,
327, 387, among many. And on pages 46-54 with repeated reliance on Cook,
his rejection of the last vestige of the "vested right" concept, suggests acceptance of the local law analysis. Elsewhere, however, the analysis of both
these scholars is in basic conflict with Cook.
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Postulatesin Policy Centered Law
The difficulties besetting conflicts today are by no means altogether peculiar to this field. A considerable part stems from the
much broader and still more general problem of re-orienting ourselves from the traditional or classical conceptual treatment of the
law to the comparatively new one, based on policy. We are in the
throes of that shift currently, accounting for much of the confusion
in the law generally and particularly in conflicts. When these difficulties are added to those arising from the other major shift in conflicts from attempts to vindicate an internationally conceived body
of rules, to national ones, the difficulties are multiplied in geometric
ratio. Hence, it becomes necessary to state certain further assumptions underlying our analysis. First as to those involving the second
shift just mentioned.
Of course, the controlling policies in the conflicts field, are
indigenous to each national 'vaw,
and completely autonomous, regardless of the sources which that law considers authoritative for
the purpose of framing rules-that much must be granted.17 But, in
the words of Professor Yntema's criticism of Cook's "local law"
doctrine, "as the ultimate truth in conflicts law..... . This is a truism
which contains neither truth nor virtue."' 8 So, in the very next
breath we must hasten to insist that each law's own policies dictate
that it talk as much like international law as it possibly can. Really
just a mongrel, it must dress itself up and bark as much like an international bloodhound as is possible. If the facts of our present political organization bar us from a genuine international law, it is our
responsibility to do our utmost to find and fully utilize all available
substitutes therefor. We go to "all the relevant facts of life required
for wise decision,"' 19 to make this search. Wherever we find facts
upon which all or most laws are led to agree that the ultimate controlling legislative power actually is in one or a limited number
of laws, it must be exploited to the fullest. This brings us to a consideration of the premises implicit in any adequate development of
a policy centered law.
17. Nussbaum, Principles of Private International Law 34 (1943);
Falconbridge, Essays on the Corflict of Laws 3 (2d ed. 1954); Cheshire,
Private International Law 20 (3d ed. 1947) ; Graveson, The Conflict of Laws
3 (2d ed. 1952) ; Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws
(1942), the entire monograph, bu: particularly Chapters I and III.
18. Yntema, supra note 15, at 316.
19. Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 822, 826
(1950), uses this phrase approvingly from Cook, to state the grounds for
making a "choice of law." Of course, we are sure that when "all the facts of
life" are considered, our thesis is fully vindicated.
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The entire conflicts problem must be thought of, first of all, as a
legislative problem. 20 One of the most serious hindrances to the development of a genuinely dynamic practice even by the modern
critics of classical conflicts has been their invariable practice of
thinking of the "choice of law" problem as one incidental, auxiliary,
and altogether subordinate to judicial action-merely a minor
aspect of judicial competence.2- This has been true in much too
large measure, from Cook right on through all our outstanding comparative law authorities.
Under our analysis, it is a matter of complete indifference
whether a given choice of law is expressed in a statute, or is developed judicially-in all cases legislative and judicial action must
be coordinated and harmonized by exactly the same policy considerations--one supplementing the other. Only on this premise
can we place in proper perspective court action, in relation to overall legislative prerogative. So, in every case where there is a foreign
element, recognized as of sufficient importance to raise a question
of whether one law or another should be applied, the resolution of
that question constitutes a "choice of law," regardless of whether
the "choice" is made through a traditionally recognized conflicts
rule, expressing a long established category, or is accomplished informally, casually, and indirectly.
Though saying that they must both be studied in any complete
treatment of conflicts the distinction Professor Nussbaum makes
between "spatially conditioned internal rules," and "regular conflicts rules, ' 22 will illustrate. Under the above proposition, I must
reject the distinction he would make between a statute by its terms
reaching all insurance contracts governing interests situated within
the state, cited as an example of a "spatially conditioned internal
20. Describing the principal defect in Cook's analysis, Yntema says,
.Cook's (analysis) was deficient in two.major respects. First, it largely

ignored the phenomena of legislation as contrasted with adjudication .. "
Yntema, .rpra note 15, at 316. See, also, Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction and
Recognition of Divorce Decrees-A Comparative Studyv, 65 Harv. L. Rev.
193, 227 (1951) ; Graveson, Jurisdiction,Unity of Domicile,and Choice of Law
under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1949, 3 Int'l L. Q.
371, 377 (1950). For a vigorous assertion of the contrary view, see Morris,
The Choice of Law Clause in Statutes, 62 L. Q. Rev. 170 (1946) ; Unger,
Capacity to Afarry in the Conflict of Laws, 15 Mod. L. Rev. 88 (1952); cf.
Travers v. Holley, [1953] 2 All E. R. 794, adapting conflicts doctrine to

changing legislative policy.

21. Excepting Yntema's criticism of Cook, supra note 20, because he
analyzed the conflicts problem exclusively as though it were a judicial problem, every authority cited supra has given an exclusively judicial treatment to

our problem. To these, may be added even Cheatham and Reese, Choice of
Applicable Law, 52 Col. L. Rev. 959 (1952).
22. Nussbaum, Principles of Private International Law 72 (1943).
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rule," in conflict with the forum's own conflict of law rules governing contracts. We have noted elsewhere the prospect of the contract
field becoming more or less re-aligned according to the governmental interests in the subject matter thereof.23 To me, this is
simply a case of the situs (or domicil) in reliance on its paramount
governmental interest therein, changing its "choice of law" rule
for this particular type of contract-insurance contracts. 24 Again,
it is often insisted that the rule that "the domicil governs succession
interests . . ." is but a part of the internal succession law of the

situs. Such argument is just an attempt to maintain the integrity of
certain preconceived notions of the essential nature of conflicts
rules. Such rationalizing is wholly incompatible with a policy
centered law.
Similarly, we submit, as a second proposition required by a
policy law, that the view that conflict of laws rules compose a system
of doctrine which always governs except when "public policy" intervenes and prohibits their application, is but a rationalization to
preserve the integrity of an inadequately conceived system of
law and must be flatly rejected. Every rule of law is but a verbalized expression of policy with respect to certain facts and issues.
For whatever reason, if one rule is found not to be applicable in the
particular case, because of special facts or issues, another must be
framed (verbalized policy) for the case at hand. One of these
rules is no more and no less law than the other. The presently
framed rule does not serve to "suspend" the operation of anything.
The rule said to be suspended is just found not applicable, having
been framed too generally and vaguely in the first place. The
doctrine of "ordre publique," is in part 25 a cumbersome concept de-

vised to make some concessicn to national (governmental) interest,
within the general framework of a system of conflicts supposedly
with universal application. In a completely policy oriented conflicts
there is no place for it.
A third axiom stems from a policy conflicts: Since every rule is
an integral part of some national law, and since such rule is but a
verbalized expression of policy, to determine exactly to what law a
23. Briggs, The Jurisdictional-Choice-of-Law Relation in Conflicts
Rules, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 11:39-1194 (1948).
24. Another type of such statute is found in Young v. Masci, where
New York extended her tort law beyond her borders, to subject to liability a
car owner, never in the state: Young v. Masci, 389 U. S. 253 (1933).
25. Husserl, Public Policy and Ordre Public,25 Va. L. Rev. 37 (1938).
Whether "ordre public" is considered as a basic doctrine of a universal
system of private international law, or of each national law, as discussed by
Husserl, it is submitted that this statement is correct.
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particular rule belongs, we trace to its ultimate source the recognized power (if it exists) to determine the form that rule is to take,
for the precise facts and issues involved. Whose rule really is the
rule that the domicil governs succession interests ;26 that the place
of the celebration of a marriage ceremony determines the validity
of the marriage; that the forum applies its own procedural rules
but takes substantive rules from S ;27 that the domicil of the settloror of the trustee, etc., controls the essential validity of a trust ;28 that
F will not aid in the enforcing of a foreign "penal" law ;29 that a
deed or a will or contract to convey is formally sufficient if it complies with the applicable law where executed ;3o that the capacity of a
married woman to convey realty is determined by the situs-or by
her domicil? 31 Allocating these rules to the right law, in a policy
conflicts is of crucial importance for many purposes. Courts and
writers regularly have erred in answering this question. But first
determining where is the paramount legislative power for the precise issue (if such is established), provides a ready correct answer.
Incidentally, correctly answering this question is the essential pre32
liminary to solving the characterization problem, generally.
A fourth postulate of policy law is so obvious that it seems unnecessary to mention it even-nevertheless it is regularly observed
in the breach: All relevant claims or interests must be regularly
equated in a policy centered law, and every policy factor contributing to the resolution of a conflicts decision must be expressed in a
formal rule, so far as is possible. That not all relevant rules are
even recognized in many cases is one of the primary reasons why
courts so often have erred in determining to what law the above
rules belong.38
26. Utility of the JurisdictionalPrinciple in a Policy Centered Conflict
of Laws, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 667, 671, 701 (1953).

27. Id. at 681, 703.
28. Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 187 N. F. (1933); Briggs, The
Dual Relationship of the Rules of Conflict of Laws in the Succession Field,
15 Miss. L. J. 77, 110 et seq. (1943).
29. Briggs, Utility of the JurisdictionalPrinciple in a Policy Centered
Conflict of Laws, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 667, 705 n. 116 (1953).
30. Id. at 671, 676.
31. Ibid.
32. Id. at 700-706.
33. A striking example of the consequences of failing to take into account
all relevant rules is found in 1 Rabel, The Conflict of Laws 78-79 (1945),
where he ignores the situs rule completely, both as to movables and immovables, with resulting disaster in analysis. And in In re Duke of Wellington, Glentanar v. Wellington, [1947] 1 Ch. 506, the court makes the same
egregious error in attempting to apply the law governing succession to
movables-after having rendered an outstanding decision as to the law controlling interests in foreign land.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:517

We have not attempted to enumerate all the conditions for
achieving an adequately articulated policy centered conflict of laws.
We have listed those which seem required by our thesis, and which
have been pointed up and verified by our continuous testing of
that thesis. That not all exponents of a policy centered conflicts may
be expected to agree with these propositions, however, is attested
to by the criteria for achieving a policy centered law, generally
adopted by the more vocal and often more effective heralds of a new
era, based on policy. The early trumpeters of the policy cry,
apparently thought that it could be achieved simply on the grounds
of justice, equity, and convenience (or expedience), social or practical, and that each and every court was as free as the wind to
adjudicate all matters over which it could exercise any judicial
competence, at all, strictly according to its own ideas of justice and
equity, or social or practical convenience.
Authorities FavoringJustice

From Lorenzen to Llewellyn, 34 to Rabel," to Graveson, 3 to
Cavers, yes, to Yntema 3 7 who talks about the "equitable principles
that must govern conflicts," we are told that "justice and convenience" are the touchstones to wise decisions in the conflicts field.
Lorenzen early put it thus: "....

each sovereign state can deter-

mine the rules of conflicts in accordance with its own notions of
what is 'just and proper'. .. all states are primarily interested in
the proper administration of justice . . . such administration

under modem conditions often demands that a state shall apply
the rules of other states . . . (if that) seems proper. .

.

. The

general problem is, .therefore, always the same: what are the
demands of justice in the particular situation?" 38
All of the "justice" is to be measured strictly according to the lights
of the forum, according to Lorenzen, regardless of its governmental
interest in the litigation. He says:
"In certain cases, where the operative facts connect the case
with some foreign state or country, it will conclude that the promotion of the above ends require the application of 'foreign' law.
In other cases, in which the 'foreign' law is so far opposed to the
34. "If the forum ever looks to foreign rules to determine, e.g., the

distribution of a decedent's personal property, it is because of its conception...
of the forum's own convenience; and because of the forum's own idea of the
justice of the case," Comment, Acquisition of Domicil in Extraterritorial
Countries, 28 Yale L. J. 810, 814 (1919) (S. T. Yen & K. N. L., presumably
K. N. Llewellyn).
35. 1 Rabel, The Conflict cf Laws 89 (1945). Rabel assumes that it is
the forum's conceptions of justice properly developed that must control.
36. Graveson, The Conflict of Laws 6 and 30 (1952).
37. Yntema, supra note 15, at 299, 317.
38. Lorenzen, Territoriality,Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33
Yale L. J. 736, 748 (1924). (Italics supplied.)
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local law as to shock the conscience of the court, it will determine
the case with reference to the local rule. As justice can be
administered only in accordance with the sense of what is right
existing in the community in which the court sits, the feeling of
the local community cannot be disregarded altogether." 39
Granting that his proposal would destroy all accepted principles
of "certainty and uniformity," Cavers goes to ultimate extreme
lengths, out-doing Lorenzen on whom he relies heavily, in insisting that the problem properly stated simply is that of a "search for
the just decision in the principal case."4 At this point, the traditional position of English equity is called to mind: ".

.

. in deter-

mining whether there is an equity, the court regards English not
foreign law, and if, according to English law, there is an equity,...
the court will enforce it, although the equity may be one not recognized by the lex loci rei sitae ....,""Although, in his original statement of his "local law" theory, Cavers may have stopped just one
step short of this position, he seems to embrace it wholeheartedly,
when he portrays what he considers the correct "local law" theory,
a la V. V. Cook, saying:
"Cook regards the jurisdictional problem as essentially a false
one. His theory provides no rule for the guidance or compulsion
of the court in choice-of-law cases; the forum is left free, within
bounds set by precedent and statute, to make the choice on the
basis of 'all the relevant facts of life required for a wise decision.' ,,142
All of this, with no apparent recognition whatever, that once a
sincere attempt is made to evaluate and balance all the competing
interests (any one of which might form the basis for a "just" decision, if assumed to be paramount) it may develop that the most
"just decision" requires that an exclusive legislative power be
recognized in a foreign law acting through its courts.
Just how far one may become bemused with these declarations
that "justice" and "equity" are the guide posts for the future, is tellingly revealed by a recent excellent work on the law of expropriation. The author gives us a trenchant elaboration of the thesis that
the situs' law always is the controlling law in confiscation cases, in
39. Ibid.
40. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem,47 Harv. L. Rev.
173, 179, 193 (1933).
41. It re Anchor Line, [1937] 1 Ch. 483, 488, quoting approvingly
British So. Africa Co. v. DeBeers Cons. Mines, [1910] 1 Ch. 354, 387. Also
see Ex parte Pollard, Mont. & Ch. 239, 250 (1840), and comment thereon in
Gordon, The Converse of Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 49 L. Q. Rev. 547, 549
(1933).
42. Cavers, The Two Local Law Theories, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 822, 826

(1950).
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complete agreement with our position.4 3 However, in attempting
to describe what policy consideration should guide any court in
determining what effect it should give a French decree depriving a
Frenchman of his citizenship, and confiscating all of his property, he
falls back on Lorenzen's exposition of the "equitable and the just,"
saying, "comity, therefore, implies a freedom of action on the part
of the court permitting it to consider all relevant factors .... Obviously the determination will be based upon the forum's conception
of what is moral, just and proper under all the facts of the situation."4 4 To climax this inconsistency of treatment, after fully approving the lex situs to govern all issues as to what interests, if any,
arise from deeds and wills made abroad, Re expresses great concern
over a recent leading case embracing what he critically calls "renvoi"
in its frank inclusion of the situs' conflicts rule in a reference
thereto.45 If Professor Re were to ask himself realistically why F
refers to the situs' law, he surely would find that it was not for a
reason leaving F free to apply the situs' internal law, regardless of
whether the situs itself chose to apply it. Can there be any doubt that,
if S has a statute determing the validity of a will or a deed by either
of three or four laws alternately, F must include that rule in its
reference? F does not choose S's law because it is as free as the wind
to pick and choose any law it prefers, so that it can select the dispositive rule it prefers rather than that which S prefers.
Disillusionment
Notwithstanding the high hopes of these oversimplifiers of the
problem, the rationale described in the views reviewed above, has
proved disappointingly unproductive. This is fully attested to, not
by its congenital opponents, but by its own disciples. As early as
1943 Professor Cavers opines that,
"To this end (giving stable guides, based on social considerations, to a 'free' court) ... Cook has contributed relatively little.
In his discussion of specific conflicts problems, Professor Cook
invokes 'social and economic considerations' . . . but seldom
presents them. Those that emerge are usually such familiar suggestions as that a married woman's capacity to sue her husband
in tort is more a matter of concern to her domicile than to the
place of wrong... I think there may be reason to doubt whether,
*. . answers can be found by reference to 'social and economic
considerations. . . . The difficulty lies, . . . in the fact that the
43. Re, Foreign Confiscations in Anglo-American Law 42, 49-50 (1951).
44. Id. at 42.
45. Re, The Testamentary Disposition of Land in the Conflict of Laws,
27 St. John's L. Rev. 36 (1952).
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courts are called upon to determine issues which are much
narrower than the kinds of questions in response to which we
can marshal social and economical data. As these and kindred
thoughts begin to grow, I find a flagging in my own zeal for
detecting logical inconsistencies, mechanical rules, or even
hard cases ... "46
Reviewing Cook's collection of essays, Lorenzen frankly declares
that,
"In his treatment of renvoi, Cook adds nothing of a constructive
nature .... Nor does Cook's discussion of the characterization
problem throw any new light upon that question." 47
And very recently, a remarkably penetrating discussion by Professor
Yntema, one of Cook's closest personal friends, perhaps has sounded the death-knell of the local law analysis, laying bare some of its
most serious defects 4 8-defects obscured only by the self-assurance
of the neo-realists of the twenties and the thirties. Something of
the reasons for this failure may be suggested by Professor Nussbaum's incisive analysis of the public policy concept, and his defense of its use (though unfortunately still by way of "exception"
to generally controlling rules). Paraphrasing him, "In the abstract,
everything seems to speak in favor of the liberal trend calling for
'justice in the particular case.' The desirability of securing justice
to everyone and of eliminating the sources of injustice are so manifest that any discussion seems to be a waste of time. The picture
changes, however, just as soon as one tackles concrete situations
49
suggested by actual cases.1
Governmental Interest
If "equity and justice," pulled down from out of the sky, are not
adequate foundations for the development of a policy centered law,
what basis is adequate? I already have dragged in by his heels,
through the backdoor, the villain "ofthis piece-or its hero, according to your tastes. Actually you are well acquainted with him-but
since not necessarily in his present role, I want to dress him up and
introduce him to you, without further delay. I submit for your consideration the concept of "governmental interest," to serve as a
catalyst for the resolution of many conflicts problems.
The concept "governmental interest" restates and focuses our
attention on the unique factor present in every conflicts situation.
46. Cavers, Book Review, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1170, 1172-1173 (1943).
47. Lorenzen, Book Review, 52 Yale L. J. 680, 682 (1943).

48. Yntema, supra note 15, at 314-317.

49. Paraphrasing Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in
thc Conflict of Laws, 49 Yale L. J. 1027, 1053 (1940) : "So long as one contemplates the problem of interstate public policy in the abstract, everything
seems to speak in favor of the critics .. "
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I am convinced that any genuine policy oriented conflict of laws must
be primarily concerned with the resolution of potentially conflicting
governmental interests. When you consider concrete cases today,
the issues almost always emerge in those terms.5" These fields
which we say are described by our graph here, are simply those
which have been resolved on that basis by pure common law development, because of their relative simplicity-more or less by
accident, one might say. There has developed general agreement as
to where recognized paramount legislative power, should be vested,
because of the quantity and quality of its governmental interest in
the litigation. With conflicts rules rooted in the dynamic factors in
each type of case, the law with the governmental interests draws to
itself all questions and issues within the range of that interest-as
that the situs controls contracts to convey; a clear corollary thereof is
that such law cannot assert a legislative prerogative over questions
and issues properly within the sweep of other governmental interests inhering in other states-the situs as such cannot control the
validity of an owner's foreign marriage. Such rules can reflect the
political and social pattern that is significant-they become a true
and complete portrayal of the facts of controlling significance,
rather than merely reflecting a sterile extension of highly formalized
concepts as to the nature of sovereignty or of law.
There are numerous fields and issues over which some one or
limited number of politically organized societies have a clearly
paramount concern in having the issues resolved according to its
mores, rather than those of some other society. Selection of the
controlling law, based on such governmental interest, requires use
of the "jurisdictional principle" as we have deffned it above. Its
need is common enough to make it an essential factor in any conflict of laws developed on policy. So our answer to our title is that
50. An apparent misunderstanding as to the sense in which we use
"governmental interest," emerged from the discussion following the presentation of this paper at the round table last winter. The questioner seemed to
believe that we propose at least a quasi totalitarian concept. Nothing is farther
from the truth. The suggestion here simply is that, where, in fact, it can
be determined that some one state has an admittedly greater concern in the
interest involved, than any other, all further questions as to how that interest
should be delimited, be turned over to that state. The "proper law of the
contract" concept, approved by English courts, is a fragmentary application
of the principle. Selecting the governing law on the basis of "paramount
governmental interest," recognizes the concern, and very legitimate interest
that every dynamic society has in the persons and things most closely associated with that society. It is a unifying concept recognizing the greatly expanding function of the law in all societies, to achieve given results thought
to be highly desirable by that society, concerning persons and things constituting the "bone and sinew" thereof. That society's highest values may
compel it to go to extreme lengths in implementing its own ideas of "justice"
for the individual.
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the "jurisdictional principle" based on "governmental interest" is
an essential conceptual and analytical tool for any policy centered
conflict of laws.
I believe that "governmental interest" both preserves the enduring values of traditional doctrine, and provides the necessary
dynamic approach to conflicts problems generally. Even though
it is by no means a universal panacea, its use thus is justified for
the following reasons: 1. It is fully supportable historically; 2. Governmental interest is entirely compatible with current doctrine,
beliefs and assumptions in the socio-political realm; 3. It does a
better job harmonizing all the various interests with the least
sacrifice to any, than any other approach, because it permits the
most complete articulation of policy, and permits the faithful observance of the "conditions" for developing a policy centered law,
listed above; 4. In the fourth place there is a surprisingly large
measure of agreement among modern students of the law that this
is the most satisfactory criterion on which to resolve a conflicts
situation.
HistoricalBasis
We cannot review here the large and wide ranging body of case
material supporting "choice of law" on the basis of governmental
interests. The fact is that, whenever a court states a policy rationale
for selecting a particular law, it practically always either is on the
basis of governmental interest, or of reasonable expectation of the
parties.5- Further, specific criticisms of traditional conflicts nearly
always have been based on the contention that it is mechanistic,
and a priori, requiring the application of laws having little or no
interest in the litigation.
Still further historical support is found in the fact that "governmental interest" is at the heart of the "due process" concept as developed both at the common law,5 2 and constitutionally, going far to
bridge the supposed chasm between those two. This provides an
opportunity for us to agree strongly that "equity and justice"
are basic concepts in the conflict of laws-properly channeled. It is
their undisciplined, anarchical, wide sweeping use, which leads to
gross error. Left at the level simply of "convenience" or "justice,"
as conceived by the forum-at the free choice of law level, if you
51. All the articles cited note 1 supra bear out this statement.
52. Dean Griswold recently has given us a forceful statement of the
principle that the "due process" concept extends to every facet of governmental action, in the second of a collection of three addresses, published under
the title, The Fifth Amendment Today 31 (1955). Though his concern is to
limit and channel the scope of legislative committee action, the principle is
equally applicable to determine the reasonableness of applying a law to any
person or subject.
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please- the compulsive elements contained in many fields of litigation remain completely hidden. Thus stated, every court has an
equally free choice to decide, for example, how the interests in foreign land should be delimited. But the fact is, that only the situs
possesses this unqualified freedom-not just any law and court.
But in insisting on limiting this kind of freedom to the situs, we do
not deny that the concepts of "justice and equity" may also play a
part at times, in the formulation of some jurisdictional rules. Every
jurisdictional rule applied by a court must be its own, giving
expression to its own policies on recognizing legislative power. So
we find these principles operating at the jurisdictional level wherever
the issue is whether an asserted legislative jurisdiction by another
law is a reasonable one, applied to the persons and/or subject matter
involved. This has given rise to the substantial development of what
may be called common law clue process-epitomized in the Isle of
Tobago case, 53 with others building on it. And in the United States,
the Supreme Court always has recognezd that a primary questionin terms of justice, even-has been, what are the relationships, and
the condition between I, individual, and a sovereign state, which
justifies the application of that state's law to I rather than the laws
of some other state. Of course, this is most manifest when S state
asserts a legislative jurisdiction over I, not generally exercised at
common law. Though the limiting effect of the jurisdictional principle is clearest in this kind of case, the criteria relied on for establishing the presence of such jurisdiction as well as for measuring
its limits, exist generally. Further, these limitations of due process
are being stated more and more in dynamic terms-in light of the
interest that a given government has in a given social situation or
setting, considering the nature, character, quality and relationships
involved therein. Hence I strongly agree with Learned Hand"4 and
Professor Yntema that conflicts under our Constitution generally
should be models for interpational situations. 55
53. Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East 192 (1808).
54. Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253 (1933), and Scheer v. Rockne
Motors Corp., 68 F. 2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934), in subjecting a car owner, never
in the state of the injury, to personal liability for physical injury resulting
from a collision in which his car was involved, while driven by a third person
on the latter's own business, imlosed by a statute in the lex loci delictus, are
prime examples thereof. And, though the former decided the limits of due
process strictly under our constitution, Hand assures us, in the latter case,
that the principle there adjudicated is equally controlling in the international

field.

55. Ibid. Yntema, supra note 18, at 299: "This conclusion, it will be remarked, rejects the assumption frequently made that conflicts arising among
the legal systems of a composite state basically differ from international conflicts of laws in that the latter essentially involve clashes among sovereign
powers. This all too common view confuses the issues... "
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The Isle of Tobago still cannot bind the whole world-but in
certain given situations, it may bind many people and many relations
-and it may be evident either on the ground of pure necessity,
and/or of due process, and/or as a means of securing still further
interests, that such power to bind in the given situation must be
recognized as existing in Tobago only, and in no other. The claim
to recognition presented by a foreign law, because of paramountcy
of interest, is the new factor, which must be added to a domestic
suit, limiting the freedom of the local legislature and court, acting
jointly, to frame the law according to their own particular ideas of
the "just law." Hence, it becomes clear that there are different orders
-differing hierarchies of policies, to be expressed in legal rules.
In short, every conflicts case impinges on a complex of interests,
often so diverse and so intricate, some clearly of controlling effect,
with others subordinate thereto, once the court tries to take into
account every interest involved, that it becomes apparent that everything possible should be done to show the proper relationship between the controlling and subordinate policy considerations. An
adequate balancing of all the interests cannot possibly be achieved
in any other way. Cook became aware of this fact finally-although
it took pressure from such articles as Dean Griswold's Renvoi Revisited,0 to force him to develop the idea. For example, very tardily,
he came to admit that, however much "justice" or "social convenience" might require that the capacity of a married woman to
convey real property, should be measured by her domiciliary law,
the only law in a position even to consider the argument, is the situs
law. 57 So, he devoted a full article reasoning, not with just any court,
but with the situs court,', that it should "choose foreign law" for
certain purposes to adjudicate interests in local land. Again, though
earlier, he had used the contract to convey as an example proving
the correctness of the "intent of the parties" rule to control contracts, "9
in 1940 he asked why the situs' should not also control contracts to
convey, since it so obviously controlled deeds.60 Entirely consist56. Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1938).
57. Cook, "Iminovables" and the "Law" of the "Situs," 52 Harv. L. Rev.
1246, 1247, 1264 et seq. (1939) ; also published as Ch.X, in Cook, The Logical
and Legal Bases of Conflict of Laws 252 (1942).
58. Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1938).
59. Cook, "Contracts" and the Conflict of Laws: "Intention" of the
Parties, 32 Ill.
L. Rev. 899, 910-911 (1938); also published in Ch. XV,
Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of Conflict of Laws 389, 404-405 (1942).
60. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of Conflict of Laws 227 (1942) :
"It is universally agreed that the law of the situs of land can and does determine the validity of all deeds no matter where executed and delivered; why
can not the same law, if the statute properly construed so says, also determine
the legally binding character of agreements to convey?"
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ent with our underlying thesis, these latter conclusions are in basic
and direct conflict with his criticisms of Story's maxims. 61
What is true of land is certain to be just as true in other fields
if we set out to reach certain ends in those fields, which can be
achieved only provided all legal systems select one particular law
and then decide this particular case just as the courts there would
decide it.
Consistent With CurrentDoctrines
Our second point is that this principle (selecting the governing
law in terms of governmental interest) is consistent with modem
socio-political theories recognizing every distinct autonomous society, as a dynamic organism contributing positively to the well
being of mankind. It is now recognized that each such society, with
its own peculiar history and culture, and with the will to act
affirmatively in what it believes to be the best interests of its people
and of its own survival, may be expected to -contribute in unique
and major ways to the total of human experience and of eventual
world culture-to show both what is, and what is not socially
possible.6 2 And if, as we believe is desirable, there develops a
genuine universal social science, within the framework of which all
the various forms of societies are justified-provided they do not
pose a direct threat to each other and are not imposed from outside,
this principle would become progressively more and more aptas a basis for resolving conflicts.63 And in terms of the special
political institutions of the United States: concrete cases remind us
that, in that political society, it often is said that one of the greatest
61. Cook, The Jurisdiction of Sovereign States and the Conflict of
Laws, 31 Col. L. Rev. 368, 379 (1931): ".

.

. if we actually allow 'California

law' (as between New York domiciliary, and California situs laws) to regulate the matter-as in fact we say we do-we see that these other portions
of the postulates are violated." Also published as Ct II of Cook's monograph,
cited supra, note 60. That Cook tries to the end to maintain consistency, is
attested by the following: "That the basis of the (situs) rule is social convenience and nothing more is discussed in some detail in Chapter II." Id.
at 253 n. 9.
62. This proposition is implicit in all movements, attaining tremendous
proportions in recent years, seeking to relate law to the particular society
from which it springs, exemplified in Pound, Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence,24 Harv. L. Rev. 591 (1911), and 25 id. 140, 489 (1912)
Stone, The Province and Function of Law (1950).
63. Suggesting a program for UNESCO, we have stated this proposition thus, elsewhere: "If UNESCO assumed responsibility for initiating a
continuous study for the purpose of developing a genuine universal social
science within the framework of which all the various forms of societies are
justified-and are recognized as even a necessary part in the developing of
civilization, and then helped further in spreading such 'gospel' throughout
the cultures of the world, it would serve the dual purpose both of reducing
the impulses to war and of greatly increasing the prospects for all nations to
accept a genuine international government." Briggs, Book Review, 7 Mont.
L. Rev. 99, 104 (1946).
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contributions of a federalism to the science of government is the
opportunity it affords to experiment legislatively in over fifty jurisdictions without serious injury, nationally, from the grosser mistakes made therein. 6' And a realistic appraisal of the times makes it
clear that the resistance by all societies against interlopers and intermeddlers trying to peddle internationally their own particular brand
of justice and equity, even in individual cases, without regard to
the policies thereon, of the law with the most substantial interest,
is going to increase for some time to come, rather than recede.
Harmonizes Conflicts
Our third contention is that governmental interest harmonizes
more policy issues with less sacrifice to any, than other approaches.
Wherever there is a clear and apparent paramount governmental
interest, we have an obvious basis upon which to achieve complete
agreement-internationally, if you please-as to what law must
ultimately control. Hence, we serve the very strong interest or
policy seeking uniformity. To implement that proposition, any
foreign court, looking for example, to the "whole law" of the situs,
recognizes that the latter's court is the only one "free as the wind" to
adjudicate on the basis of "equity and justice"-or "to render the
wisest decision possible on the basis of all the facts of life"--or to
give effect to other substantial, though subordinate, governmental
interests in another state.65 So, wherever we find substantial agreement among all or a limited number of coordinate legal systems, we
have the basis for achieving both substantial uniformity, and substantial "justice" in the particular case.
Basic Agreement
The evidence supporting the fourth proposition, that there is
basic agreement among writers, supporting our thesis, is almost
conclusive. We have intimated that, often there is apparent agreement, where in fact, there is revealed fundamental disagreement,
on a thorough analysis. One of the most encouraging things revealed
64. Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of

Laws, 49 Yale L. J. 1027, 1054 (1940) : "State legislative experimentation is

going on and may be extended in the future. Opportunity of territorially
limited experimentation has been recommended as one of the advantages of
the American constitutional system. .. ." That this principle is profoundly
influencing current constitutional doctrine, see: Lincoln Fed. Labor Un., AFL
v. N. W. Iron and Metal Co., 335 U. S. 525 (1949); IBTCW Un., Local 309
v. Hanke, 339 U. S. 470 (1950).
65. Very possibly, giving effect to a further substantial, though subordinate governmental interest in another state will be the most common reason
causing the controlling law to make a further reference to another law-as
where the situs chooses the domiciliary law of a married woman to determine her capacity to convey local land.
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by our studies, however, is the fact that, actually, there is a very
large area of agreement among practically all writers and courtsthose who seem to disagree most violently, as well as others.
For example: Although Falconbridge verbally rejects the principle "acquired rights," and the use of the "jurisdictional principle,"66 nevertheless, he gives one of the best criticisms in legal
literature of the practice in ecuity of adjudicating rights in foreign
land "indirectly" by acting on the person.67 Moreover, he gives most
cogent reasons for not including any of the personal law's conflicts
rules, in a reference to either the domicil or the national law.68
Further, in discussing the rule that the matrimonial domicil determines the validity of a foreign divorce, he insists that "renvoi" is
not involved, but rather that it is a matter of "jurisdiction." '
(Parenthetically, if he has in mind "judicial jurisdiction," as he
has suggested in personal correspondence, the answer is that the
"judicial jurisdiction" here is based on a prior determined paramount legislative jurisdiction.) And finally, his general estimate of
the practice of including foreign conflicts rules in a reference to
foreign law, stated as follows, clearly brings his present position
much closer to that expressed herein than was his original uncompromising stand against renvoi, generally: ". . . there are special
situations and special questicns as regards which the renovi is a
justifiable and useful expedient, but... the doctrine... should not
be adopted as a general principle, applicable to all situations and all
questions. ' 70 Demurring to the suggestion that it be used merely
as an "expedient," we here try to provide a definitive and clear guide
as to what extent and under what circumstances the practice of including foreign conflicts rules should be followed in a genuine
policy centered law.
Perhaps the most dramatic example of basic agreement, where
verbally there appears to be nothing but disagreement with those
favoring any form of "renvoi," is found in Professor Cheshire's
treatment of that subject. Although he categorically rejects "renvoi"
in any and all forms, in an elaborate and thorough discussion of the
66. Though stated more cautiously than in his first edition, his entire
discussion of Cook's rejection of "legislative jurisdiction" and of the "acquired right" rationale, demonstrated his approval thereof: Falconbridge,
Essays on the Conflict of Laws, Ch. 2, particularly from page 24 (2d ed.

1954).

67. Id. at Ch. 29, especially page 599 et seq.

68. Id. at 190-194.
69. Falconbridge, Essays on the Conflict of Laws 181 (1st ed. 1947).
70. Falconbridge, Renvoi in New York and Elsewhere, 6 Vand. L. Rev.

708 (1953).
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problem,71 he concludes that discourse by agreeing that there are
some five issues or fields in which an English court may be expected
to include the applicable conflicts rules in a reference to a foreign
law: 1. To determine the formal validity of a will of movables; 2.
Validity of a foreign divorce; 3. Title to foreign land; 4. Title to
foreign movables; 5. Capacity to marry.72 The last four of these
particularly are the primary fields on which we have relied, and
the first one actually is included in number four. More importantly
yet, on the strongest policy grounds, Cheshire states the proper
procedure for these fields exactly as it is depicted in the above
graph. Both for movable and immovables, he makes it clear that
it is only the situs' conflicts rule that is included in a reference
thereto, 73 and that the reason is to prevent the foreign court's judgment from being a brutum fulman. Hence, at no point does he
suggest that a reference from the situs should ever include any
foreign conflicts rule. He rationalizes the law governing a foreign
divorce in exactly the same way,7 4 finding an exclusive legislative
power in the matrimonial domicil to dissolve a marriage, as "merely
a particular application of that still wider doctrine, that the
'' 75
status of a person depends exclusively upon the law of his domicil.
And again he says,
".. . A fundamental principle, once it has deliberately been
adopted should be applied fearlessly and, in the absence of some
peremptory consideration of public policy, should not be frittered
away by exceptions merely because the views of the domicil on
the institution
of marriage are less stringent than those held by
78
England.
In the latter statement, Cheshire was voicing a criticism of the
Hammersmith Marriage Case,7 7 which, he thought, had not been
consistent with its own major premise, that the domicil should control. A paraphrase of this statement reveals complete agreement
between Cheshire and the chart swpra:
"The English Courts recognize an exclusive legislative power
to divorce in the matrimonial domicil for two reasons: a. Clearly
the marriage status is of substantial concern primarily to that
society in which the parties are permanent inhabitants; so that
law, and it alone, should have jurisdiction to determine whether
that status should be terminated; b. Vesting this exclusive power
71. Cheshire, Private International Law 85-129 (3d ed. 1947).
72. Id. at 127-128.
73. Ibid. "The English Court must ascertain what rule a Court of the
situs would apply to the particular case under consideration." Id. at 587.
74. Id. at 127, and 481 et seq.
75. Id. at 482.
76. Id. at 483.
77. The King v. Superintendent Registrar of Marriages, Hammersmith,
[1917] 1 K. B. 634.
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in that law also increases greatly uniformity in the condition of
their status everywhere."
These are the policies supporting what Cheshire calls "a fundamental principle." When he says it should be applied fearlessly, what
he means, in terms of policy, simply is that, if states accept these
policies as controlling at the outset, they must not immediately
render individual decisions vitiating these "controlling" policies.
That is our position exactly.
A comparative study of other authorities continues to reveal a
a substantial measure of this basic agreement. Rabel readily approves utilizing the "jurisdictional principle" giving effect to governmental interest, when he says:
"... the nationality principle does not mean that a foreign national is subject necessarily to the substantive law of his country;
it means that the state to which the individual belongs should
determine his personal relations. The law of domicil does not
mean that everybody must be subject to the substantive law of
of the
his domicil. The reasonable construction is that the law
78
place of domicil determines what law should govern."
However, he puts the controlling power in the wrong law, at least
for tangibles of all kinds.79 Wrolff's views go far toward coinciding
with our graph, when he points out the absurdity of rendering judgments having no validity except in the lawyers' files.80 There is little
in Dean Graveson's discussion of the conflicts field, inconsistent with
our analysis-his analyses certainly contribute to the policy centered
shift.8' Several years ago, Professor Rheinstein recognized special
merit in our attempt to demonstrate a common principle under
which both the situs law and the personal law may be found
applicable to a single issue:
"It seems that you are the first scholar in a common law
country to discover a set of problems which have for some time
been attracting the attention of European writers only that in
Europe these problems have been so far treated not under one
comprehensive aspect but under two different headings ....

I

have already mentioned that the phenomena of 'reference' and
Naeherberchtigung (withdrawal of the proper rule in favor of
lex situs) have not been brought together. Your idea that they
of a common principle deserves serious
may both be expressions
8 2
consideration."
78. 1 Rabel, The Conflict of Laws 78 (1945).
79. Id. at 78, 79.
80. Wolff, Private International Law 580, 581 (1945).
81. Graveson's emphasis on the principle of justice as the touchstone to
conflicts decisions by English courts puts it squarely on policy: Graveson,
The Conflict of Laws 6, 30 (2d ed. 1950). That this emphasis is not inconsistent
with our analysis, see discussion at footnotes 52-56 supra-it simply does not
provide a complete rationale.
82. From personal correspondence, dated November 2, 1948.
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If you find any novelty in these conclusions that there may be
enough basic agreement among all concerned to make possible a new
starting point, and ultimately a new synthesis of doctrine, you may
be more surprised yet by the fact that Professor W. W. Cook was
rapidly approaching a position which eventually would have forced
him to re-embrace the "jurisdictional principle"-he already had
done so in every way except formally, and he certainly showed a
readiness to resolve conflicts issues in terms of governmental interest wherever he got down to concrete cases. His treatment of the
question of what law should govern the capacity of a married woman
to convey land dramatically testifies to these facts. Immediately
following the appearance of Dean Griswold's article entitled
"Renvoi Revisited,118 8 seemingly for the first time, Cook's attention
was called to the need for a more careful examination of the law
governing interests in realty. He had not concentrated long on that
field when he discovered what he considered to be an extremely
important, and he thought wholly novel fact: this was that the word
"law" in the rule that "the law of the situs governs all interests in
land," cannot possibly mean the same thing for the situs court, that it
means for any non situs court. He agreed that, for non situs courts,
on grounds of "practical convenience," the word "law" must, or
at least should mean the "whole" law of the situs,8 4 but insisted that,
for the situs court it must mean only the situs' "internal" law. To
quote him:
"This brings us to the main point of this paper, one which
has been overlooked by practicallyall courts and writers,namely,
that the rule that the 'law' of the situs is to be applied furnishes
no guide whatever to a court of the situs, unless it is first assumed that the word 'law' in the rule means in such a case the
purely 'domestic' rule of the situs, and not its conflicts rule.
"We are thus confronted with the fact that if a court of any
state other than the situs applies the rule, the word 'law' means
the conflicts rule of the situs, but if a court at the situs is called
upon to apply the very same rule, it can do so only by giving the
verbal symbols, 'law of the situs,' a different meaning, namely,
the domestic rule of the situs."'85
As I have said elsewhere:
"Having rejected the jurisdictional principle, Cook is forced
to treat the problem as simply one of semantics. In contrast, we
say that submerged in the 'law-of-the-situs' rule as traditionally
stated are the embodiment of our two classes of rules. The
83. 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1938).
84. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of Conflict of Laws, Ch. X,
252-253 (1942).
85. Id. at 264.
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Conflicts Restatement in Sec. 8, expresses only the jurisdictional
rule, which-and this is very important-contrary to Cook's
statement, is just as present in the situs' law as a general proposition as in any other law. It controls in all laws. When the situs
court looks to its own law, it finds the situs rule controlling
jurisdictionally. Then it looks further and finds an applicable
choice-of-law rule which is,not present in any other legal system
for this partciular land-so the choice of law rule, even though it
should refer further to the situs' internal law, is not "the very
same rule" as the "situs rule" applied jurisdictionally by a foreign court." 86
But notice that, when Cook discusses the question of what law
should be utilized to determine the capacity of a married woman to
convey land, his analysis conforms entirely to our graph. He urges
situs courts at the "choice of law" level to feel free to select the
domiciliary law for this purpose, on the eminently sound ground
that the rules so regulating implement the governmental interest of
the domicil in protecting its females, rather than any particular
interest of the situs respecting the preservation of its realty."8 And
he grants that the situs court should refer directly to the domicil's
internal rule so regulating, s9 as depicted in the graph.
Of special interest also, in suggesting the measure of actual
agreement found among scholars is the treatment that Professors
J. H. C. Morris and G. C. Cheshire give to maritime shipping contracts. Criticising a recent leading English case, they declare that:
"The conclusion is suggested that the proper law of a contract is
what Westlake said it was, namely the law with which the contract
has the closest factual connexion (hereinafter called the 'proper
law'). It by no means follows from this that the parties can never
be allowed to select a law with which the contract has no factual
connexion, if the "properlaw' allows them to do so.""'
How better can the "closest factual connexion" be determined
than by paramountcy of "governmental interest ?" So, the selection
of the "proper law," measured by "governmental interest," establishes the jurisdictionalrule for contracts, because these authorities
themselves say that that law may further choose (or may choose
86. Briggs, Utility of the Ju'risdictional Principle in a Policy Centered
Conflict of Laws 667, 699 n. 98 (1953).
88. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of Conflict of Laws 270-276
(1942).
89. Id. at 275, seemingly app roving that procedure in Proctor v. Frost,
89 N. H. 304, 197 AtI. 813 (1938).
90. Morris and Cheshire, The ProperLaw of a Contractin the Conflict
of Laws, 56 L. Q. Rev. 320, 337 (1940), critically discussing Vita Food
Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., Ltd., [1939] A. C. 277.
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not) to allow the parties to select still a third law actually to govern
the carriage contract. This is a classic expression of the "dual
category" of conflicts rules, and may be a highly desirable developing
procedure for the contracts field9 1 And in a very recent article,
Professor Morris urges serious consideration to extending the
"proper law" concept to the torts field). 2
Finally, I recently received a letter from Professor Pilenko of
Paris, inquiring about my studies on renvoi, called to his attention
by Professor de Nova. Pilenko has sought to resolve "renvoi" by
resort to "comparative law," hoping to establish basic agreement
as to what internal rule should apply without getting into the
circulus inextricabilis.In comparison, though we go first of all to
the facts in search for the limiting conditions, rather than directly
to comparative law doctrine, the meaningfulness of our approach
for "renvoi" depends on the extent to which those facts lead to basic
agreement among all legal systems-and the supposed "renvoi"
problem has developed where there is such basic agreement. Hence,
our approach likewise winds up at the comparative law level.
Indeed, it would seem that the principle difference, if any, remaining between this analysis and those of most of these eminent
scholars just mentioned, is that of whether these particular fields
should be stated as exceptions to a rule, or should be taken as being
specific illustrations of a general procedure of indefinite scope-that
is, the practice of recognizing an exclusive power in some one legal
system, and then deciding this precise case just as would that foreign
law, through its courts. I believe that practically all of the persons
just mentioned will accept the premise that, for many different fields
and issues, we have not explored the possibility of achieving general
agreement by selecting some one law as controlling in this manner,
and so we cannot be sure how general may be the utility of this
analysis without sustained investigation of the problem, with our
ultimate aim always being the best job possible of balancing all of
the interests involved in each case.
Nussbaun--the "Homeward Trend"?
Contrasting briefly certain basic conclusions reached by an eminent authority in the comparative law field with those required by
our thesis, should help you pass judgment thereon. (I have used
Professor Nussbaum's discussion because, although he often reaches
91. For fuller discussion of Morris' analysis of the "proper law," see

Briggs, JurLsdictional--Choice-of-LawRelation in Conflicts Rules, 61 Harv.
L. Rev. 1165, 1192-1193 (1948).
92. Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 881 (1951).
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conclusions differing from those required by our analysis, he has
considered many of the same questions, and more adequately than
most, that seem fundamental to me.)
Nussbaum's discussion of a "principle" which he believes is
supported by cases, and the illustrations he gives therefor, indicate
to what extent the whole conflicts problem is considered as almost
altogether a "judicial" one-all systems of conflicts rules to be administered simply as part of the judicial process.9" A comparison of
his interpretation of these illustrations with that required by our
thesis, also places in sharp focus some of the issues involved.
Nussbaum finds a large body of cases from different fields
demonstrating what he calls "the homeward trend" in conflicts. To
him all of the following "rules" are nothing but examples of the
forum finding an excuse to apply its own law: 1. Divorces are
invariably decided under local law--"the only conflicts problem
being the question of jurisdiction." Apparently he is thinking solely
of "judicial jurisdiction" ;94 2. The tendency to read into unwelcome
foreign statutes territorial limitations checkmating their applications
in the case at bar: "Thus it has been assumed that territorial qualifications must be read into Bolshevist decrees contrary to their manifest
purpose; that German exchange control decrees timidly leave unaffected German assets held abroad" ;95 3. In Buchanan v. Rucker,
Lord Ellenborough interpreted a statute of the Isle of Tobago, permitting a service of process against a person then "absent from the
island," by mailing a copy of the summons to the courthouse door,
as purporting only to affect persons subject to the jurisdiction of
the court ;96 4. Nussbaum establishes his tolerance of this "trend"
by climaxing these illustrations with a qualified approval to the
practice of "renvoi'"-but only as to remission, not transmission,
because the . first places the reference back in the forum's law,
while the latter would carry it still further away from that law. He
says,
"Were the court's choice merely between two foreign legal systems, one should probably stick to the basic Conflict rule, regardless of the foreign Conflict rule.... But in view of tremendous
advantages to the administration of the law, inherent in the use
of law and language familiar to the court and to counsel, courts
are perfectly justified in construing
the Conflict rule as unfit and
97
inapplicable to renvoi situations.1
93. Nussbaum, Principles of Private International Law 37 (1943).

94.
95.
96.
97.

Ibid.
Id. at 38-39.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 94.
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By this view, the question of whether "renvoi" should or should not
be practiced, and if so, how much, is exactly the same for every
court, regardless of its governmental interest in the suit.
To me, this interpretation showing the "homeward trend" generally, is a tragic misconstruction of these fields and cases. I am sure
that Professor Nussbaum has pictured for us only one side of the
coin. Let us examine the other side. If there ever was a valid principle, with any generality of application, it is that, "The Isle of
Tobago cannot pass legislation binding the whole world." This principle extends into every facet and operation of the law-it does not
arise only as an incident to judicial action. All states, whether
acting judicially, or otherwise, are just as ready to limit the unqualified language of their own statutes as they are foreign statutes
-so, by Nussbaum's interpretation, "acceleratingflight to a foreign
law." So, construing a Montana statute recently,9 8 in terms, making
void all marriages between any persons of different races, either of
whom had ever been a resident of Montana (and note this limitation in the statute itself), the Montana court very properly pointed
out that, if applied literally, the statute would go beyond any recognized interest of Montana; hence it must be presumed that the
legislature intended that the statute apply only to its domiciliaries
at the time of marriage.9 9 Likewise, in a series of recent English
decisions involving foreign confiscation decrees, discussed in my
article appearing currently in the Yale Law journal,' the courts
refusing to give effect to the foreign decrees were acting as the
situs court, not just any old court; furthermore, they quite as
readily recognized the validity of those decrees as to chattels found
within the confiscating government's territory on the date of the
decree. 01' Moreover, all courts by a restrictive interpretation, regularly limit the scope of the unqualified language found generally in
98. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 48-109 (1947). The section was repealed

by Laws 1953, Ch. 4, § 1.
99. It re Takahashi's Estate, 113 Mont. 490, 494, 495, 500, 129 P. 2d 217
(1942).

100. Briggs, Renvoi in the Succession to Tangibles: A False Issue
Based on Faulty Analysis, 64 Yale L. J. 195, 198-200 (1954).

101. Invalidating nationalization when "English" situs: Civil Air
Transport, Inc. v. Central Air Transport Corp., [1953] A. C. 70 (P.C. 1952) ;
Frankfurther v. W. L. Exner, Ltd., [1947] 1 Ch. 629; Banco de Vizcaya v.
Don Alfonso de Borbon y Austria, [1935] 1 K. B. 140 (1934) ; In re Russian

Bank for Fn. Trade, [1933] 1 Ch. 745, 767. Validating nationalization when
"English" situs: Lorentzen v. Lydden & Co., [1942] 2 K. B. 202 (1941),
relying heavily on and following Anderson v. N. L. Transandine Handelmaatschappil, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 547, aff'd, 289 N. Y. 9, 43 N. E. 2d 502 (1942).
When situs in nationalizing state, always valid: A. M. Luther v. James

Sagor & Co., [1921] 3 K. B. 532; Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz, [1929]
1 K B. 718.
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statutes dealing with interests in land, to local land-again "accelerating flight to a foreign law," if we look only to this side of the picture. But, of course, neither catchy phrase is accurate. To interpret
correctly either side of the coin, it is necessary to describe and
interpret both sides together, as part of a single phenomenon. When
we look at one side only, we discern a flat plane, only, with a lifeless
picture thereon; but when we consider the other side as well,
judging the two together, and finding them united by the mettle
between them, having depth, weight, and value, we discover that
the whole coin serves a vital function in social life wholly different
from that suggested by a cursory examination of the one flat side
alone.
In our case, the mettle uniting the two sides is "governmental
interest." Surely it tortures "divorce jurisdiction" to cite it as proof
of the "homing instinct" in conflicts. This is the best example of all
proving that the issues are settled according to governmental interest. To analyze properly, we don't start with the judicial process and
then find that the court always winds up applying its own law.
Rather do we find here complete formal agreement that the state
with the paramount governmental interest in the marriage-and, so,
in determining when that status should be dissolved-is the matrimonial domicil-regardless of where the acts prejudicing the
marriage relation may have occurred. So obviously, its law must
control; since that is the case, there being no real "choice of law"
problem in any such divorce action, judicial jurisdiction to grant
the divorce should be localized in the domiciliary court-for exactly
the same reasons that actions in rem concerning realty are
localized in the situs court. This does not mean, however, that the
matrimonial domicil may not or cannot utilize the law of still another state for certain purposes. If and when it does develop such
choices of law, other laws should follow that lead, just as they have
done with the developing choice of law rules from the situs of land,
utilizing another law. And, indeed, precisely that practice is developing apace, when we say that the whole law of the matrimonial domicil should be looked to to determine the validity of a
02
"foreign" divorce.1
Finally, we must mention Nussbaum's position on renvoi. For
him, the only effective reason for renvoi is that it gives the forum
102. Armitage v. A. G. (1906) p. 135; Dean v. Dean, 241 N. Y. 240,

149 N. E. 844 (1925); Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 8(2) (1934);

Cheshire, Private International Law 481 (3d ed. 1947) ; Griswold, Divorce
Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees-A Comparative Stldy,

65 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 223-225 (1951).
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an excuse to apply its own law-so he approves remission but flatly
rejects transmission. In contrast, we say that is not the reason at all
for including foreign conflicts rules. If, as we believe, that reason
often is in pursuance of ends which can be secured only by deciding
the case as nearly exactly like the foreign law would decide it, as is
practicable, there is fully as much reason for accepting and following
a transmission as there is for accepting remission. And, even if one
does not agree with this analysis, I believe you will agree that stating
the problem clearly in terms of policy, and bringing to the fordfront
for discussion the basic policy issues, helps to clarify, and even to
reveal for the first time some of the basic issues involved in the socalled "renvoi problem."
Limitations on Value
Of course, we make no pretense that developing the "dual category" in conflicts and the practice of keeping carefully separated,
rules used jurisdictionally from those functioning as genuine choice
of law rules, provides a universal panacea giving ready answers for
all conflicts problems. You should reject forthwith, any such purported solution. Nevertheless, the utility of the "jurisdictionalprinciple" is limited only by our own capacity to make a choice between
competing "governmental interests." How serious may be that
limitation, remains to be seen.
The value of this analysis has been demonstrated primarily as a
tool to reveal the error in those areas where we have found courts
with no other significant governmental interest in the litigation
than as forums, completely ignoring the law which, by their own
governing doctrine, has the recognized paramount governmental interest-i.e., legislative jurisdiction. Of course, a conflicts problem is
not always posed between a forum with no such interest, and another state with a clearly paramount interest.
Instead, it may involve issues among two or more interested
states, in which, with every additional fact, the balance of interest
shifts from state to state. The question of what law determines the
effectiveness of a purported ratification of the acts of an originally
unauthorized agent, may illustrate this situation.1 0 3 Or the issues
may be between two different states asserting a power in the name
of different governmental interests-neatly illustrated in Clark v.
Williard'0 4 where the interest of Iowa, as the corporate domicil,
103.

Compare Briggs, The Jurisdictional-Choice-of-Law Relation in

Conflicts Rules, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1203 (1948), with Griswold, Renvoi
Revisited, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1200 (1938).

104. Clark v. Williard, 292 U. S. 112 (1934); further affirming supremacy of Montana's power over assets sitused there, on second appeal:
id. 294 U. S. 211 (1935).
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in conserving the assets of an insolvent domestic insurance corporation, was pitted against'0 5 the interest of Montana over corporate
assets sitused there.
A variation of this theme is found in two recent Supreme Court
decisions dealing with the power of a state to cause property to
escheat to it. In the first one, the Court upheld the power of New
York to cause unclaimed proceeds from life insurance policies,
issued for delivery in New York on the lives of New York residents
(apparently the Court assumes that the proceeds likewise are due
New York resident), to escheat to the State. In the second case, it
ruled that New Jersey could constitutionally claim "abandoned"
shares in a New Jersey corporation, with dividends, declared and
payable but unclaimed. Very possibly, these powers will come to be
held to reside exclusively in the respective states. Or again, the two
governmental interests may not conflict directly at all, but only
casually, tangentially, or peripherally. An illustration is Pemberton
v. Hughes0 6 in which the English court, in deciding whether the
deceased left a widow to take an English sitused estate, ruled a
prior divorce in Florida valid-for the sole purpose of establishing
the rights of the claimant-though it was assumed to be strictly
void in Florida. 1

7

Still another variation in these conflicts is found

in those cases where that interest constantly shifts from state to
state, as where a child is constantly moved from one state to another,
with the issue one of custody thereover, and often complicated by an
outstanding custody award, rendered by a court clearly with competence at the time rendered.
In none of these problems is there the slightest suggestion that
governmental interest, and the legislative jurisdictional principal,
are irrelevant. Quite to the contrary, in every one of them, our problem is intensified by the fact that we have entirely too much governmental interest. In the last three particularly, the courts act judicially in order to implement a governmental interest found to reside
in their government. So, they are the very antithesis of the so-called
"local law" approach. Paramountcy of power in Montana was a
foregone conclusion-until the Supreme Court is prepared to
modify dynamically established doctrine in the name of a new
emerging interest. The English law certainly is entitled to characterize the word "widow" in its. inheritance law, for local tangibles,
as it sees fit. And on the basis of established doctrine, mere presence
105. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U. S. 541 (1948) ; Standard
Oil Co., App'l v. State of N. J., 341 U. S. 428 (1951).
106. [1899] 1 Ch. 781.
107. Id. at 790-791.
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of the child for the time being, certainly gives that court a large
measure of power over it.108

However, the last problem, child custody, illustrates this fact': In
the shift from the conceptual to a policy centered law, many courts,
finding themselves freed from the restrictions supposedly governing
them in the past, have not yet accepted their full responsibilities in
trying their best to discover and to weigh carefully all the interests
involved. 10 It is believed that, when they do so, they will more
generally agree that the mere presence of a child for the time being,
rarely if ever will justify interfering in custody decrees rendered
by an admitted domicil or legal residence 0 -assuming that court
has sufficient jurisdiction over the persons and the subject matter
to support its decree, under the latest United States Supreme Court
decision"' thereupon.
Analysis Under Full Faithand Credit Clau~se

Mentioning that Court suggests the further question of what
part, if any, this analysis should play in any consistent extension of
full faith and credit so as to convert, generally, "choice of law" questions into constitutional issues under that clause. If the United
States Supreme Court continues to enlarge "full faith and credit" to
require the application of some particular law, to the exclusion of
all others, as certain recent cases strongly indicate,1 1 2 sooner or
108. The interest of the state, expressed in pareits patriae,provides even
a more compelling reason for exercising whatever power is necessary to
"preserve" the child in an emergency, than for recognizing power over
chattels, in the "locus for the time being," to determine the legal effect of
local transactions purporting to transfer title thereto. However, no such reasons justify tampering with the permanent status of the child. See Rheinstein,
Jurisdiction in Matters of Child Custody, 26 Conn. B. J. 48, 63, 65 (1952).
109. This statement is based on American decisions only, not English.
The problem, based at least on multiple domicils, will arise very infrequently in England; where all parties are domiciled in England, it can arise
only under the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925, which makes the "welfare
of the infant" paramount in all cases: In B's Settlement, [1940] Ch. 54;
McKee v. McKee, [1951] A. C. 352, 1 All E. R. 942.
110. In a thoroughgoing analysis of American cases, Ehrenzweig seeks
to demonstrate that the formulation of Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 145147 (1934), based on exclusiveness of jurisdiction in the child's domicil, "has
not been the law, and should never be the law": Interstate Recognition
of Custody Decrees, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 345 (1953). But demonstratipg that the
Restatement is only "verbally" adhered to, and that actually courts feel free
to withhold or to render inconsistent awards, according to the "equities" of
the case, by no means establishes that the job of intelligently equating all the
interests involved is done any better. See also, Ehrenzweig, Recognition of
Custody Decrees Rendered Abroad, 2 Am. J. Comp. L. 167 (1953).
111. May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528 (1953). Must have personal jurisdiction over both parents to render binding custody decree.
112. First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342
U. S. 396 (1952) ; Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U. S. 609 (1951), reinforced by a
1948 amendment to 28 U. S. C. § 1738 (1952), extending full faith and credit
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later, it will be faced with what will appear to be essentially the
"renvoi" problem which has proved so intractable on traditional
analysis. That is, the question inevitably will arise whether the
reference to any law referred to under the full faith and credit clause
must go directly to that law's internal rule (treating it strictly a
domestic transaction there), or must include that law's choice of
law rule. When this question emerges as one generally requiring
solution,113 it would be tragic indeed, if discussion of the problem
were pitched in terms of the arguments waxing furious on that
supposed "problem" in the past. The Court can cut straight through
to the heart of the problem only if it examines long and searchingly
the interests and the policies causing it to select some one law to the
exclusion of all others. If it continues to make such selection on the
basis of a "paramount governmental interest" therein, as we find the
common law has done in numerous fields, 1 4 then, it finds helpful,
ready answers in this analysis. If however, it assumes the immensely
greater responsibility for selecting an exclusive law on the basis of
welfare, for each and every issue it may conceivably require pointing out directly the dispositive rule which must be applied. That
is, does it intend generally simply to select that law with the recognized legislative power (allowing it to make the actual choice),
or will it select directly the controlling dispositive rule--or will
the required practice continue to vary according to the "subject
matter" of this suit? In any case, the present analysis will aid
greatly in defining the problem and stating the issues to be resolved.
to "acts" of sister states. Earlier decisions so suggesting, either have been
treated as anomalous, or as having been weakened by later cases. Compare
Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. S. 531 (1914), and progeny, with Bradford
El. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932).
113. Though there have been isolated cases really involving the problem, the Supreme Court has not formally considered it, in the general terms
of whether, if F, the forum, must "apply" the law of another state, such
reference is "jurisdictional" in character, or is as a genuine "choice of law."
The rule of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941),
that, in a diversity case, a federal'court must include the "choice of law" rule
of the state in which it is sitting, under Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938),
must be distinguished, on the one hand, as must also a case where the
"choice of the proper law" involves clearly federal issues, on the other, as in
D'oench, Duhme & Co. v. Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp., 315 U. S. 447 (1942).
114. The basis on which the Supreme Court has selected the law of the
situs of land as controlling interests therein, in the past, categorically establishes the jurisdictionalcharacter of the situs rule, but not so for many other
fields. When Jackson insists, in a "tort" action, that, if the Illinois court
assumes jurisdiction at all, ". . the Constitution would require it to apply
the law of Utah, because all elements of the wrong alleged here occurred
in Utah . . .", does the reference include any special "choice of law" which
Utah might make? First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 342
U. S. 396, 400 (1952).:
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Courts Shcndd Seek Internal Consistency
Rooted entirely in, and justified wholly by existing "law," this
analysis does not ask any court to accept alien doctrine or novel
procedures-it only asks of the courts that they achieve internal
consistency in their own law among all the many (policy) rules
applicable in the conflicts field, attempting to make clear that procedure which is absolutely required by the common law's own
fundamental tenets. Whether stated in terms of doctrine, principles,
rules, or policy, many, if not most of the supposedly intractable
problems in conflicts have arisen from attempts at different times
to be guided by policies which, when their interrelationships are
carefully examined, are in basic conflict with each other. A few
examples follow.
It is firmly established in the United States that the situs of movables controls its succession, and that, hence, if the rule that the
domicil governs succession interests therein is applicable, it must
be only because the situs adopts that rule. If the same controlling
principle governs the common law generally, as I believe it does,
how can any court possibly continue to assume that the domiciliary
-succession rule is its own "choice of law" rule ?"r This inconsistency is dramatically illustrated by the differing treatment that In re
Duke of Wellington'1 6 gives to Spanish land, contrasted with
Spanish movables. Again, is it not ridiculous for any court to continue to insist that it is competent to create equities in foreign land
without regard to that law? The least that must be admitted is that
any such equitable interests exist only at the situs' sufferance. Is
there a rule in modern English equity forbidding the English court
from measuring such equities by the situs' law or is the determining of that law thought to be impossible ?11
115. The fundamental importance of being clear on this issue is strikingly established in Meijers, The Benelux Conention on Private International Law, 2 Am. J. Comp. L. 1 (1953). Pointing out that, though generally,
under the convention, the "national" law is selected, in certain cases, the
domiciliary law in chosen, instead, he further observes, "The cases sub 2 and
3 seem to be applications of the theory of renvoi, but in reality they are not.
In these cases the Dutch judge applies the law of domicil, not because a
foreign law so decrees but because a secondary rule of his own law prescribes
the law of domicil as applicable. The practical consequences are.., the law
of domicil is determined according to the Dutch conception of domicil and
not according to that of the national State... ." (Italics added.) Id. at 3.
"Characterization" becomes no problem at all once the relevant rule is
integrated into the correct law, as we insist is always true.
116. In re Duke of Wellington, Glentanar v. Wellington, [1947] 1 Ch.
506, discussed at length in Briggs, "Renvoi" in the Succession to Tangibles:
A False Issue Based on Faulty Analysis, 64 Yale L. J. 195, 201 et seq. (1954).
117. The Canadian Supreme Court did not think so in Duke v. Andler,
[1932] Can. Sup. Ct. 734, when it refused to recognize a California judg-
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A further condition to acceptable decisions is that the rendering
court do its best to describe correctly and exactly the grounds for its
decision, and the procedure it follows. An extreme example of a
court failing to do this, with the utmost confusion resulting-and a
very illuminating one- is Kotia v. Nahas,'15 wherein the court
approved the "sitting and judging as the foreign court" formula
both as common law doctrine, and under its applicable statute, and
purported to decide the case accordingly, without ever asking realistically, whether the foreign court would include the situs' conflicts
rules when referred thereto by its own choice of law rule. This
certainly is not "judging as the foreign court," though the case repeatedly has been cited as a leading case therefor, and was relied
on heavily for that practice in Wellington.
Finally, is it not outrageous for fundamentally conflicting policies to control the legislature, on the one hand, and the courts on the
other, on the same issue-subject sometimes possibly, to the limiting
effect of the courts' conceptions of "due process ?"
Adhering to these simple suggestions, the broader implications
of our thesis inevitably, though gradually, become apparent.
Conclusion

Although we have relied on, and have found extensive support
for our analysis in strictly traditional doctrine, the analysis has
peculiar relevancy today, assuming a new and critical importance,
because it is possible thereunder to make some concession to the
terribly devisive elements in the international realm, suggested in
part by the most recent pronouncements of a famous French authority' -9 in the field, without abdicating thereto. Rejecting Niboyet's
excessively nationalistic treatment, national interests hereunder
are recognized without surrendering the ideal of an ultimately
ment on the ground that the latter court had determined equities without

reference to the situs law. See Briggs, "Renvoi" in the Succession to Tangibles: A False Issue Based on Faulty Analysis, 64 Yale L. J. 195, 203 n. 51
(1954).
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Conflict of Laws, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 582 (1952), and his Traite de Droit International Prive Francais, Vol. 3, as reviewed in Wolff, A New Doctrine on
PrivateInternationalLaw, 63 L. Q. Rev. 323 (1947). It is hoped that Niboyet
and other European scholars do nct embrace "territoriality" in its mechanistic
applications, right at the moment that the common law is expressing the
strongest dissatisfaction with it. As editor of the French edition of the
Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Niboyet evidently has been greatly influenced by the "territoriality" found there-perhaps too much so, in its more
formal applications.

"JURISDICTIONAL PRINCIPLE"

genuine universal system of laws-which last is possible only as
we succeed in building the necessary institutional foundations therefor, both cultural and political.
So, in closing, I would summarize the case for the "jurisdictional
principle," under present world conditions, in two perspectives:
I. In the shorter, narrower perspective, it is needed to implement the law in all those cases where, on one policy or another, an
exclusive legislative power is recognized to reside in some one or
limited number of determinate laws, because of a paramount governmental (i.e., national) interest therein. At this level, a large degree
of universality is possible, and actually is achieved wherever general
agreement exists as to where such power resides, still preserving
"diversity" at the "choice of law" level.
II. Then, in the more general perspective, the "jurisdictional
principle" may be considered simply an analytical tool, (A) for
demonstrating that there are different hierarchies of policies; (B)
which most effectively contributes to the organizing, systematizing,
and more complete articulating in explicit rules, the greatly varying
and diverse policies included in a conflicts situation.

